In this paper, we empirically investigate whether trade liberalization a¤ects markup dispersion, a potential source of resource misallocation. The identi…cation uses China's WTO accession at the end of 2001. We show that trade liberalization reduces markup dispersion within a narrowly de…ned industry. We also examine both price and cost responses to trade liberalization, as well as heterogeneous effects across …rms and across locations. Our study contributes to the literature by identifying another potential channel through which free trade bene…ts a nation.
Instead of identifying sources of misallocation, we investigate how to reduce misallocation degree, and, more speci…cally, examine the e¤ect of trade liberalization on markup dispersion. With substantial reductions in trade costs and advancements in telecommunications and logistics, globalization has become a dominant feature of the world, and has signi…cantly changed world production in the past decades. By intensifying market competition, trade may a¤ect the distribution of …rm markups through two channels: adjustment of markups by surviving …rms (the intensive margin) and entry and exit (the extensive margin). Depending on the distributional assumption of …rm productivity draw, theoretical predications are mixed. Using the Pareto distribution, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and …nd that intensive and extensive margins of trade liberalization on markup dispersion cancel each other out in the equilibrium. However, de Blas and Russ (2012) and Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014) …nd that the departure from the Pareto distribution can cause the distribution of …rm markups to be responsive to trade costs.
This paper contributes to the above literature on three grounds. First, instead of assuming distributional functions and deriving theoretical results, we use real data to check whether trade liberalization a¤ects markup dispersion. Understanding whether markup dispersion changes or not in response to trade liberalization is an important step in investigating the pro-competitive role of trade-that is, change in trade costs may a¤ect resource reallocation across …rms through changes in markup distribution. Second, we explore one of the most important trade episodes in the 2000s-China's accession into the WTO-and use the most comprehensive …rm-level data in China from 1998 to 2005. The liberalization degree upon WTO accession in China is found to be large (for a detailed description of China's WTO accession, see Lardy (2002) ), and its e¤ects on the competitiveness of Chinese …rms and welfare gains are found to be signi…cant. For example, …nd that a 10 percent reduction in tari¤ protection leads to a permanent 6 percent increase in industry-level productivity. And di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang (2012) calculate overall welfare gains of 3.72 percent compared to autarky. Third, we use newly compiled data to more accurately estimate production function and calculate …rm markups (for details on empirical data, see Section 4.1). Speci…cally, we are able to measure output in physical terms (which avoids the omitted output price bias), adopt a ‡exible speci…cation of production function (i.e., translog), and use a control function approach developed by to address the issue of omitted …rm-speci…c input prices (for detailed discussion of our production function estimation and comparison to other approaches, see Appendix B). The markup calculation is based on the methodology developed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2013) , which relies on the intuition that the output elasticity of a variable production factor equals its expenditure share in total revenue only when price equals marginal cost and in a world with imperfect competition, markup is the wedge between input revenue share and output elasticity of this input (see Section 3.3 for details of the markup estimation).
Our identi…cation is essentially a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) estimation, that is, we compare markup dispersion in industries experiencing greater tari¤ reduction upon WTO accession (the treatment group) to that in industries experiencing less tari¤ reduction (the control group) before and after 2001, the time of WTO accession. We …nd that trade liberalization signi…cantly reduces the dispersion of …rm markups. Results hold for di¤erent measures of markup dispersion, inclusion of many industry-varying characteristics, and …ner de…nition of industries.
The validity of our DID estimation hinges on two assumptions: (1) the treatment group would have followed the same trend as the control group in the case without WTO accession, and (2) no other policy reform di¤erentially targeted our treatment and control groups at the time of WTO accession. As checks on the …rst identifying assumption, we …rst show that treatment and control groups followed the same trends in markup dispersion until the WTO accession, then began to diverge right after the accession. Second, we carefully investigate what caused tari¤s to di¤er across industries before WTO accession (or the pretreatment di¤erences between treatment and control groups), then control for potential di¤erential trends in markup dispersion after WTO accession generated by signi…cant pretreatment di¤erences, a approach similar to the one used by Gentzkow (2006) . Third, we check and rule out the possibility that …rms may have changed their behavior and, hence, markup dispersion in anticipation of the WTO accession.
As checks on the second identifying assumption, we control for two important ongoing policy reforms in the early 2000s, i.e., the state-owned-enterprises (SOE) reform and the relaxation of FDI regulations. We also control for changes in intermediate input tari¤s and the e¤ect of accessing foreign markets. As further robustness checks, we use two placebo tests (i.e., the sample from the pre-WTO period and the sample of processing traders), control for cross-product-within-industry tari¤ variations, and control for multiindustry issues (see 
for details).
To gain further insights about how trade liberalization changes markup dispersion, we …rst verify that imports increase more in product categories experiencing greater tari¤ reduction, thereby establishing the market competition linkage. We then investigate markup responses at di¤erent quantiles along the distribution, and …nd that trade liberalization increases markups at the lower quantiles but reduces them at higher quantiles, which in turn ‡attens the markup distribution. Furthermore, we look at price and marginal cost components of markup separately, and …nd that trade liberalization reduces the dispersion of both prices and marginal costs. Finally, we uncover heterogeneous effects across …rms (i.e., surviving …rms versus entries/exiters; SOEs versus non-SOEs) and across locations (i.e., coastal versus inland cities).
Our paper is related to several strands of literature, as well as the studies on resource misallocation mentioned above. The …rst strand re ‡ects the recent renaissance in gains from trade, due to the availability of micro-level data and development of new theories. In a recent in ‡uential paper, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) show that bene…ts from free trade can be pinned down by two parameters: share of expenditure on domestic goods and an elasticity of imports with respect to variable trade costs; these results apply to a variety of trade models with or without …rm heterogeneity. However, the constant markup assumption used by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) excludes any pro-competitive e¤ects of trade. In contrast, using a variable markup setup, Edmon, Midrigan, and Xu (2014) quantify the gains from trade using data from Taiwan. Our work departs from Edmon, Midrigan, and Xu (2014)'s in that, …rst, they use a structural estimation approach, while ours is a reduced-form estimation; second, they conduct a counterfactual analysis of trade liberalization, whereas we study a real incident of trade liberalization. Our study is also related to literature on the relation between trade and average markups, such as work by Levinsohn (1993) , Harrison (1994) , Krishna and Mitra (1998) (2014) . However, there are signi…cant di¤erences in focus between these studies and ours (i.e., markup level vs. markup dispersion), and hence the welfare implication. If the reduction in markup levels comes through productivity improvement, this constitutes a productive e¢ ciency gain channel from trade. However, as industries/…rms are potentially a¤ected di¤erentially by trade, allocative e¢ ciency may be improved or worsened. Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-1957 ) make the point that rendering already competitive sectors even more competitive reduces overall welfare. Recently, Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014) develop a formula to decompose overall welfare gains from trade into improvements in productive e¢ ciency and allocative e¢ ciency, and Hsu, Lu, and Wu (2014) further show that the latter can be a signi…cant component of welfare analysis of trade in the case of China's WTO accession.
In the context of China, investigate how China's WTO accession a¤ects productivity growth at both …rm and industry levels, as well as outcomes such as industry average price de ‡ators and industry average markups. While both their and our papers consider bene…cial e¤ects of WTO accession on the domestic economy in China and use the same data, there are several important di¤erences. First, the two papers investigate di¤erent channels for gains from trade. 's focus on productivity gains (as well as industry-average markups) con…rms traditional welfare gains from trade through productive e¢ ciency improvement as identi…ed by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), whereas we investigate another important channel of gains from trade, that is, the change in markup dispersion, which in turn a¤ects resource allocation within an industry. Second, the two papers use di¤erent methods of production function estimation, which is a crucial step in the construction of …rm productivity and markups. estimate a revenue-based and CobbDouglas production function, which results in (1) the same output elasticities of inputs across …rms in the same sector and (2) potential biases from omitted …rm-speci…c output and input prices (see , for more discussion of these issues).
To address these concerns, we estimate a quantity-based and translog production function with a control function for omitted …rm-speci…c input prices (for comparison of di¤erent production function estimations, see Appendix B). 1 
I. Background: China' s WTO Accession
The Process.-In July 1986, China noti…ed GATT (WTO's predecessor) that it would like to resume its status as a GATT contracting party; this lasted for 15 years. Between 1987 and 1992, as China debated whether to continue the market reform or move back to the planned economy system, the return to GATT was suspended. Momentum resumed after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour speech in 1992, and in July 1995, China o¢ cially applied to join the WTO.
A pivotal aspect of China's WTO accession process involved bilateral negotiations between China and WTO members. New Zealand was the …rst country to sign a bilateral agreement (in August 1997) with China regarding WTO accession. However, negotiations between China and the U.S. took 25 rounds and four years before an agreement was reached in November 1999. After that, China signed agreements with 19 countries within six months, including Canada in November 1999 and the European Union in May 2000. In September 2001, China signed an agreement with Mexico, at which point negotiations with all WTO member countries were complete. Finally, on November 10, 2001, WTO's Ministerial Conference approved by consensus the text of the agreement for China's entry into the WTO.
Tari¤ Reduction.-As a condition to joining the WTO, China carried out a large and widespread tari¤ reduction between 1992 and 1997. Speci…cally, in 1992, China's (unweighted) average tari¤ was as high as 42.9%. Shortly after the GATT Uruguay round of negotiations, China substantially reduced tari¤s, i.e., the average tari¤ dropped from 35% in 1994 to around 17% in 1997. There was little change in tari¤s after 1997, however, until China joined the WTO at the end of 2001.
In early 2002, China started to ful…ll its tari¤ reduction responsibilities as a WTO member. According to the WTO accession agreement, China was required to complete tari¤ reductions by 2004 (with a few exceptions to be completed by 2010); average tari¤s for agriculture and manufacturing goods would be reduced to 15% and 8.9%, respectively. [Insert Figure 1 here] Interestingly, tari¤ reduction upon WTO accession exhibited great heterogeneity across products. As shown in Figure 1 , the ratio of tari¤s at the 25th percentile to those at the 75th percentile also dropped sharply in 2002 and then stabilized after 2005. In Figure 2 , we further plot the relation between tari¤s in 2001 (the year just before WTO accession) and changes in tari¤s between 2001-2005 across 3-digit industries (the unit used in the main regression analysis). 2 Clearly, there is a strong, positive correlation, implying that industries with higher tari¤s before WTO accession experienced greater tari¤ reduction after WTO accession. Presumably, China had to reduce tari¤s to WTO-determined levels, which are quite uniform across products, whereas China's pre-WTO tari¤s varied widely across products.
[Insert Figure 2 The speci…cation for our DID estimation is
where i and t represent industry and year, respectively; y it is the measure of markup dispersion in industry i at year t (see Section 4.3 for details); T arif f i2001 is the tari¤ rate of industry i in 2001; 3 P ost02 t denotes a post-WTO period, taking a value of 1 if it is year 2002 and onwards, and 0 otherwise; i is the industry …xed e¤ect, controlling for all time-invariant di¤erences across industries; t is the year …xed e¤ect, controlling for all yearly shocks common to industries, such as business cycles; and " it is the error term. To cope with the potential heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation, we cluster standard errors at the industry level (see Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan, 2004) .
To isolate the e¤ect of trade liberalization, we control for several time-varying industry characteristics (X it ) that may a¤ect markup dispersion, such as industrial agglomeration degree (measured by the Ellison-Glaeser [EG] index, with a higher value indicating a higher degree of geographic concentration; see Ellison and Glaeser, 1997 , for the development of the measurement) and entry barriers (proxied by the average …xed asset [in log] and the number of …rms).
In the main speci…cation, we de…ne an industry at the three-digit Chinese Industrial Classi…cation (CIC) level-presumably there are relatively more observations within such de…ned industries and therefore smaller measurement errors of our outcome variable. However, to address concerns regarding any potential aggregation bias, we conduct a robustness check at the four-digit CIC level, which is the …nest de…nition in our data.
Note that we use the interaction of tari¤s in 2001 (T arif f i2001 ) and the post-WTO indicator (P ost02 t ) as our regressor of interest, instead of yearly tari¤s (T arif f it ). One motivation is that the schedule of tari¤ reduction upon WTO accession in China was released in 2002, and hence the phase-out process is expected and could be exploited by the producers. As explained by Liu and Tre ‡er (2011), use of the interaction between T arif f i2001 and P ost02 t can capture both real and expected e¤ects of trade liberalization. Nonetheless, using yearly tari¤s (T arif f it ) produces similar results (see Appendix Table  1 , Column 3), albeit marginally insigni…cant.
B. Identifying Assumption and Checks
The identifying assumption associated with our DID estimation speci…cation (1) is that conditional on a list of controls ( i ; X it ; t ), our regressor of interest, T arif f i2001 P ost02 t , is uncorrelated with the error term, " it , i.e.,
In other words, markup dispersion in the treatment group would have followed the same trend as that in the control group if there had been no trade liberalization in 2002. Concerns may exist, however, about the satisfaction of our identifying assumptionspeci…cally, the timing of the WTO accession, the nonrandom selection of tari¤s in 2001, and other simultaneous policy reforms. First, one might be concerned that approval of China's WTO accession at the end of 2001 was expected, and therefore …rms could adjust their behavior even before tari¤ reductions took e¤ect in 2002. However, China's WTO accession process was lengthy, taking about 15 years to complete, and approval required the consensus of all WTO member countries. Although China achieved important breakthroughs by signing agreements with the U.S. in 1999 and the EU in 2000, many issues remained unsolved until mid-2001. Hence, the timing of China's WTO accession was quite uncertain before 2001. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we include an additional control in the DID regression, T arif f i2001 One Y ear Bef ore W T O Accession t , to examine whether …rms changed their behavior-and therefore markup dispersion-in anticipation of WTO accession the following year.
Second, while the use of tari¤s in 2001 is less susceptible to endogeneity concerns, the choice of these tari¤s was nonrandom, raising the possibility that treatment and control groups could be systematically di¤erent ex ante. To alleviate the possibility that some pre-existing di¤erences between treatment and control groups might also di¤er-entially a¤ect markup dispersion by these two groups even after WTO accession (and therefore contaminate our DID estimates), we …rst carefully characterize signi…cant tari¤ determinants in the pre-WTO period (for details, see Appendix A and Appendix Table  2 ), and then control ‡exibly for post-WTO di¤erences in the time path of the outcome variable generated by these pre-existing di¤erences (see Gentzkow (2006) for details on this approach). Speci…cally, we add interactions between those signi…cant tari¤ determinants (Z i2001 ) with our post-WTO indicator (P ost02 t ), i.e., Z i2001 P ost02 t , to our DID regression.
Third, if other policy reforms di¤erentially targeted our treatment and control groups around the time of the WTO accession (i.e., the end of 2001), our DID estimates might also capture the e¤ects of these reforms, making it hard to pinpoint the e¤ect of trade liberalization. Two important ongoing reforms in the early 2000s were the SOEs reform 4 Note that the identi…cation does not require our control variables to be exogeneous, i.e.,
In other words, for these control variables, estimated coe¢ cients may not have causal interpretations. See Stock and Watson (2012, p.274) for more discussion of this point. and the relaxation of FDI regulations (i.e., fewer regulations on wholly owned FDI). To control for any confounding e¤ects from these policy reforms, we include in our DID estimation SOE Share (measured by the ratio of the number of SOEs to the number of domestic …rms) and F DI (measured by the logarithm of the number of foreign-invested …rms).
To further check our identifying assumption, we conduct two placebo tests: one using only the pre-WTO data as by Topalova (2010) , and the other using the sample of processing traders. For details, see Section 5.3.
C. Estimation of Firm Markups
The crucial component in constructing our outcome variable is …rm-level markup, de…ned as the ratio of price to marginal cost. However, …rm-level data rarely contain information on product prices, let alone information on marginal costs. To recover …rm-level markup, we follow the recent work of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Speci…cally, it is assumed that the production function of …rm i at time t is
where L it , K it , and M it are physical inputs of labor, capital, and intermediate materials, respectively; and ! it denotes …rm-speci…c productivity. Production function F (:) is assumed to be continuous and twice-di¤erentiable with respect to all of its arguments. Consider the following cost-minimization problem faced by …rm i at time t
where w it , r it , and p m it denote the wage rate, rental price for capital, and the price of intermediate inputs, respectively; D it is an indicator of state-owned enterprise, i.e., taking a value of 1 if …rm i is an SOE at time t and 0 otherwise; and I [:] is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the statement in the bracket is true and 0 if not.
The constraint equation (6) captures a prominent feature of SOEs, namely that they are often required to hoard redundant labor to meet a minimum level of employment ( S it ) so as to help bureaucrats maintain social stability. 5 Note that the framework is robust to any arbitrary number of inputs. As we mainly observe three inputs (labor, capital, and intermediate materials) in our data, we here focus on a production function with only these three inputs. 6 For example, during the …nancial crisis of 2008-2009, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced publicly Estimation of …rm-level markup hinges on the optimal choice of inputs free of any adjustment cost and estimation of output elasticities of inputs. As labor is not freely chosen due to constraint (6) , and capital is often considered to be a dynamic input, we focus on the optimal choice of intermediate materials. 7 Speci…cally, the Lagrangian function associated with optimization problem (4) can be written as
Hence, the …rst-order-condition for intermediate materials is
Rearranging equation (8) and multiplying both sides by
where P it is the price of the …nal good. Note that it = @L @Q it = c it represents the marginal cost of production at a given level of output. We de…ne the markup it as the ratio of price to marginal cost, i.e., it P it it . Therefore, equation (9) leads to our estimation expression of …rm-level markup
where
is the output elasticity of intermediate materials and
is that SOEs could not lay o¤ their employees and should instead try to expand employment. 7 We admit that cost-minimization with respect to material inputs is at best an approximation for characterizing SOE behavior. It is likely that SOEs would use more materials than necessary in production because of their lack of incentives to minimize costs. Nonetheless, compared with the problem of overemployment of labor, the overuse of material inputs is less of a concern in the literature. Du et al. (2014) use the DID method to examine changes in labor employment and material inputs after restructuring, and …nd that labor employment exhibits a signi…cant decline after privatization, but materials show no signi…cant changes. These …ndings suggest that SOEs truly su¤ered from redundant employment problems before privatization (a prominent symptom of SOEs around the world) but they did not have a serious problem with the overuse of material inputs. Given that material inputs had been adjusted relatively freely even in SOEs due to their much smaller adjustment costs than those for labor, we employ materials to recover …rm-level markup. 8 Note that this expression holds under any form of competition. In particular, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) discuss alternative settings of market competition, including Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, and monopolistic competition, which lead to a similar estimation expression for …rm-level markup. the share of expenditure on intermediate materials in total revenue.
As information on expenditure on intermediate materials and total sales is available in the data, m it can be readily calculated. However, the output elasticity of intermediate materials m it requires the estimation of production function. There is extensive literature on the estimation of production function, which focuses on how to control for the unobserved productivity shock (see Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes, 2007, for a review). Solutions range from instrumental variable estimation to GMM estimation and the control function approach pioneered by Olley and Pakes (1996) . We adopt the control function approach developed by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazier (2006), which consists of a two-step estimation.
In Appendix B.1, we lay out details of our procedure in estimating the production function. Speci…cally, we use a translog speci…cation of production function, i.e.,
where the lowercase letters represent the logarithm of the uppercase letters; ! it is …rm-speci…c productivity; and " it is an i.i.d. error term. We estimate the translog production function (11) separately for each two-digit industry. Once^ = ^ l ;^ k ;^ m ;^ ll ;^ kk ;^ mm ;^ lk ;^ km ;^ lm ;^ lkm is obtained, we can calculate the output elasticity of materials as^ m it =^ m + 2^ mm m it +^ lm l it +^ km k it +^ lmk l it k it , then …rm markup using equation (10) .
A few practical details are worth noting. First, to estimate equation (11), we use a merged dataset that contains the information on output (q it ) in physical terms and therefore avoid the omitted output price bias in the production function estimation pointed out by Klette and Griliches (1996) .
Second, the estimation of equation (11) also requires three inputs (l it , k it , m it ) measured in physical quantity terms. Our dataset has information on employment, which allows us to measure labor input l it in physical terms. However, capital k it and material m it inputs are only available in value terms; speci…cally, we use the net value of …xed assets as a measure of k it and the total value of intermediate materials as a measure of m it . To back out the physical quantity of k it and m it , we de ‡ate these values with the price indices provided by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012). But this practice may result in estimation biases due to the omitted …rm-speci…c input prices (see De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014, for a detailed discussion). To correct this omitted input price bias, we use a control function approach developed by . Speci…cally, the omitted …rm-speci…c input prices are assumed to be a reduced-form function of out-put prices, market shares, and exporter status, 9 and these factors are also interacted with the de ‡ated inputs to construct a ‡exible control function. Third, we focus on a group of single-product producers to avoid the potential bias caused by the multi-product producer issue. After obtaining^ = ^ l ;^ k ;^ m ;^ ll ;^ kk ;^ mm ;^ lkm and assuming that multi-product …rms use the same technology as single-product …rms in the same industry, we are able to calculate the …rm-product-level markups and then average across products to get …rm-level markups.
Fourth, in estimating the production function, we also control for demand and supply shocks by including output prices, 5-digit product dummies, city dummies, product market shares, exporter status, input tari¤s at the industry level, and output tari¤s at the industry level. For discussion of the importance of controlling for demand and supply shocks in the production function estimation, see De Loecker (2011).
III. Data and Variables

A. Data
The main dataset used in this study comes from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF), conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period 1998-2005. This is the most comprehensive and representative …rm-level dataset in China, and surveyed …rms contribute the majority of China's industrial value-added. The dataset is used to calculate matrices in the national income account (e.g., GDP) and major statistics published in China Statistical Yearbooks. This dataset has also proved to be reasonably accurate and reliable due to the strict double-checking procedures used in data collection (Cai and Liu, 2009 ). Accordingly, it has been widely used by economic researchers in recent years, e.g., Lu, Lu, and Tao (2010), Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012), .
One drawback of this dataset is that it covers all SOEs, but for non-SOEs, only those with annual sales of …ve million RMB (Chinese currency) or more are surveyed. Hence, it is possible that both the overall degree of markup dispersion and the e¤ect of trade liberalization on markup dispersion are underestimated, as this is a relatively more homogeneous sample due to data truncation.
The number of …rms ranges from 140,000+ in 1998 to 244,000+ in 2005. These …rms are distributed among 29 two-digit (or 164 three-digit, 464 four-digit) manufacturing industries, 10 and across China's 31 provinces (including four municipalities), 344 cities, and 2,829 counties. The dataset provides detailed …rm information, including industry a¢ liation, location, and all operations and performance items from the accounting statements such as output, intermediate materials, employment, and book value and net value of …xed assets, which are of interest to us. During the sample period, there were several changes in China's administrative boundaries and, consequently, in the county or city codes in our data set. For example, new counties were established, while existing counties were combined into larger ones or even elevated to cities. Using the 1999 National Standards (promulgated at the end of 1998 and called GB/T 2260-1999) as the benchmark codes, we convert the regional codes of all the …rms to these benchmark codes to achieve consistency in the regional codes throughout the sample period. Meanwhile, a new classi…cation system for industry codes (GB/T 4754-2002) was adopted in 2003 to replace the old classi…cation system (GB/T 4754-1994), which had been used from 1995 to 2002. To achieve consistency in the industry codes for the whole sample period (1998-2005), we convert the industry codes in the 1998-2002 data to the new classi…cation system.
The dataset of Chinese tari¤s is downloaded from the WTO website. Speci…cally, we use the Tari¤ Download Facility to obtain standardized tari¤ statistics. Tari¤ data provide, for each product de…ned at HS-6 digit level, detailed information on the number of tari¤ lines; average, minimum and maximum ad valorem tari¤ duties; etc. Tari¤  data are available There are a total of 5,036 HS-6 products from manufacturing industries in our tari¤ data.
As our outcome variable can be only calculated at the industry level, we need to aggregate tari¤s from the HS-product level to the industry level. To this end, we …rst match the HS classi…cation to CIC using the concordance table from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 11 Then, for each industry and each year, we calculate the simple average tari¤. However, one could be concerned that such aggregation might conceal substantial variations in tari¤ reduction across products within an industry, which, in turn, could underestimate the e¤ect of trade liberalization. To address this concern, in a robustness check, we add the interaction between our regressor of interest (T arif f i2001 P ost02 t ) with the number of products within a 3-digit industry, to check whether industries with more HS-6 products (and therefore potentially more tari¤ variations) behave di¤erently from those with fewer products. A crucial step in obtaining …rm markup involves the estimation of production function, 11 We thank Yifan Zhang for sharing this concordance table.
which requires the observation of …rm-level output in physical terms. As this information is missing in the ASIF data, we use product-level data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period 2000-2006, which contains information on each product (de…ned at the 5-digit product level) produced by the …rm, and in particular, output quantity. As the product-level data and the ASIF data share the same …rm identity, we can easily match the two.
B. Output Elasticities and Firm Markups
For each two-digit manufacturing industry, we report in Appendix Table 3 estimated output elasticities of labor, capital, and materials at di¤erent quantiles (i.e., p5, p25, p50, p75, p95). It is found that materials play a dominant role in China's manufacturing production, while the role of capital is limited. However, there are some abnormalities in the estimated output elasticities of labor for a few industries. Speci…cally, output elasticities of labor are mostly negative in the Metal Products, General Purpose Machinery, and Electrical Machinery and Equipment industries. To ensure that our results are not driven by these three industries, we conduct a robustness check by excluding these industries. To compare our estimation of production function (i.e., quantity-based and translog production function with adjustment for input prices, denoted as Q T L IP ) to alternative approaches used in the literature, we list the output elasticities of three alternative estimations (i.e., quantity-based and translog production function, denoted as Q T L; revenue-based and Cobb-Douglas production function, denoted as R CD; and revenuebased and translog production function, denoted as R T L; all without adjustment for input prices) in Appendix Table 4 . For translog production function, we use median output elasticities in the comparison. It is found that these four production function estimations have di¤erent values and distribution of output elasticities across industries. Many output elasticities from the quantity-based and translog production function estimation without adjustment for input prices are negative; De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) argue that this is mainly due to the omitted input price bias in the production function estimation. This problem is partly avoided in the revenue-based production function estimation, similar to …ndings by De Loecker and Goldberg (2014). [Insert Figure 3 here]
We report correlations among markups from the four di¤erent production function estimations in Appendix Table 6 . It is found that markups from the production function estimation used in our analysis (Q T L IP ) are positively correlated with those from Q T L and R T L, but are negatively correlated with those from R CD. Meanwhile, correlations range from 0:09 to 0:31, suggesting that di¤erent production function estimations result in di¤erent estimated …rm markups.
As a sanity check on our estimated …rm markups, we report the correlation between mean markups and competition degree across two-digit manufacturing industries over the sample period. Speci…cally, we use the Her…ndahl index (HHI) to characterize industry competition degree, and …nd a correlation of 0:2057 (with statistical signi…cance at 1%) between these two variables. As a lower value of HHI means …ercer competition, this result indicates that markups are lower in more competitive industries, which is consistent with our intuition.
C. Markup Dispersion
A widely used measure of dispersion in the literature is the Gini index, with the value ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). While the Gini coe¢ cient has many desirable properties (e.g., mean independence, population size independence, symmetry, and Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity), it su¤ers from the problems of decomposability and statistical testability (Cowell, 1995) . As a result, a number of entropy measures have been developed to overcome these problems and reap the bene…ts of the Gini index. The most widely used entropy measure is the Theil index 12 -speci…cally,
where y f it is the markup ratio for …rm f located in industry i at year t; y it is the average markup value in industry i at year t; and n it is the number of …rms in industry i at year t.
13
Given the superiority of the Theil index over the Gini index, we use the former as the 12 We have experimented with another commonly used entropy measure, the Mean Log Deviation (i.e.,
log( yit y f it )), and …nd similar results (see Appendix Table 1 , Column 4). 13 To alleviate the concern that outliers may drive the degree of dispersion, we exclude the top and bottom 2.5% of markups in constructing the dispersion measures. main measure of markup dispersion and the latter for the robustness check. Meanwhile, we have also experimented with two other dispersion measures in the robustness checks. One is the coe¢ cient of variation (CV), de…ned as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean (i.e.,
, where V it is the standard deviation of …rm markups in industry i at year t), and the other is the relative mean deviation (RMD), de…ned as the average absolute distance of each unit from the mean and expressed as a proportion of the mean (i.e., RM D it = 1 n it
Average values for these four measures at the two-digit industry level over the period 1998-2005 are reported in Appendix Table 7 In Appendix Figure 2 , we further show the relation between markup dispersion (i.e., Theil index) and the pre-period mean markup level at the three-digit industry level. While there is a modest negative relation between these two variables, the overall correlation is quite noisy, indicating that they are capturing di¤erent underlying factors.
Note that in calculating markup dispersion, we implicitly assume that …rms only produce in one industry (i.e., the one that the …rm reports in the data). However, it could be possible that a …rm produces goods in multiple industries, but we only observe one due to data limitations. This could cause two potential estimation issues: First, our outcome variable could be measured with errors; second, our estimation might ignore the e¤ect of trade liberalization from other industries in which …rms have production but do not report in the data. To check whether our estimates are biased due to a multipleindustries issue, we …rst conduct a robustness check at the 2-digit industry level, in which the incidence of this is less severe. Moreover, we use the …rm-product merged data to determine whether a …rm produces goods in di¤erent 3-digit industries (the classi…cation level used in our main analysis). In a robustness check, we focus on a subsample of …rms producing all goods within only one three-digit industry.
IV. Empirical Findings A. Graphical Results
To illustrate our identi…cation strategy, we plot, in Figure 4 , time trends of markup dispersion (measured by the Theil index) for high-tari¤ industries (i.e., industries with tari¤s above the sample median in 2001, or our treatment group) and low-tari¤ industries (i.e., industries with tari¤s below the sample median in 2001, or our control group), conditional on industry dummies.
[Insert Figure 4 here] It is clear that in the pre-WTO period, the two groups have quite similar trends. This parallel pretreatment trend in markup dispersion between treatment and control groups alleviates the concern that our treatment and control groups are ex ante incomparable, which lends support to the satisfaction of our DID identifying assumption.
Meanwhile, there is visible divergence in trends of markup dispersion after 2002, when China started to reduce tari¤s upon WTO accession. The consistency in timing between the divergence in markup dispersion and WTO accession suggests that trade liberalization reduces dispersion of …rm markups.
B. Main Results
Regression results for the DID speci…cation (1) are reported in Table 1 . We start with a simple DID speci…cation that includes only industry and year …xed e¤ects in Column 1. Our regressor of interest, T arif f i2001 P ost02 t , is statistically signi…cant and negative, [Insert Table 1 here] In Column 2, we add some time-varying industry characteristics that may correlate with both our outcome variable (markup dispersion) and our regressor of interest (trade liberalization). Speci…cally, we use the EG index to measure industrial concentration degree, which may a¤ect …rm markups on the one hand and respond to trade liberalization on the other hand (e.g., Hanson (1998) ). The mean value of …xed assets and the number of …rms in each industry are used to capture the degree of entry barriers, which may be a¤ected by trade liberalization and also a¤ect the distribution of …rm markups. Evidently, our results are found to be robust to these additional controls.
One could be concerned that tari¤s in 2001 were not randomly determined, and hence our treatment and control groups could be systematically di¤erent ex ante, which may spuriously generate the negative e¤ect of trade liberalization on markup dispersion. However, as displayed in Figure 4 , markup dispersion degrees in high-2001-tari¤ industries and in low-2001-tari¤ industries have similar time trends in the pre-WTO period and start to diverge upon WTO accession, implying that our treatment and control groups are largely comparable. To further alleviate the concern that the nonrandom determina-tion of tari¤s in 2001 could bias our estimates, we conduct a robustness check following Gentzkow (2006) . Speci…cally, in Appendix A, we …rst identify what are the important determinants of tari¤s in 2001. As shown in Appendix Table 2 , three determinants are found to be robustly statistically signi…cant: (1) output share of SOEs has a positive e¤ect, consistent with the story that politically connected SOEs are protected by the government; (2) average wage per worker has a positive e¤ect; and (3) export intensity has a positive e¤ect, implying an export-promotion industrial policy. Meanwhile, conditional on these potential tari¤ determinants, we …nd that China's industrial tari¤ structure is not a¤ected by markup dispersion, thereby relieving the concern about reverse causality.
We then add interactions between these signi…cant tari¤ determinants with the post-WTO indicator to control for ‡exible time trends in markup dispersion generated by these signi…cant tari¤ determinants. As shown in Column 3 of Table 1 , the coe¢ cient of our regressor of interest remains negative and statistically signi…cant, and magnitude also barely changes.
C. Checks on the Identifying Assumption
In this subsection, we report results of a battery of robustness checks on the identifying assumption of our aforementioned DID estimation.
Expectation E¤ect.-In Column 1 of Table 2 , we add to the regression an additional control, T arif f i2001 One Y ear Bef ore W T O Accession t , to check whether …rms changed their behavior (and thereby markup dispersion changed) in anticipation of the coming WTO accession, which may in turn make our treatment and control groups ex ante noncomparable and bias our estimates. The coe¢ cient of T arif f i2001 One Y ear Bef ore W T O Accession t is found to be statistically insigni…cant, suggesting little expectation e¤ect. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of our regressor of interest remains negative and statistically signi…cant.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Control for Other Policy Reforms.-To control for the two ongoing policy reforms in the early 2000s (SOEs reform and the relaxation of some FDI regulations), we add two control variables (i.e., the share of SOEs among domestic …rms, and the number of foreign-invested …rms) in Column 2 of Table 2 . Our main …ndings remain robust to these additional controls.
In addition, WTO accession is multilateral and multidimensional; that is, China's trading partners may also reduce their tari¤s on Chinese imports. To …x the idea that the change in markup dispersion comes from the increase in domestic competition degree generated by tari¤ reduction, we additionally include total exports (to control for access to foreign markets) and input tari¤s at the industry level (to control for the use of foreign intermediate inputs). Regression results are reported in Column 3 of Table 2 . Clearly, our main …ndings remain robust to these additional controls, lending support to the argument regarding import competition.
Placebo Test I: Pre-WTO Period.-As a placebo test, we follow Topalova (2010) in looking at the e¤ect of tari¤s on markup dispersion in the pre-WTO period (i.e., 1998-2001). The premise is that because tari¤s did not change much during this period, 14 we
should not expect any signi…cant e¤ects; otherwise, that could indicate the existence of some underlying confounding factors. 15 As shown in Column 4 of Table 2 , we indeed …nd tari¤s have almost zero e¤ect on markup dispersion in the pre-WTO period. Placebo Test II: A Sample of Processing Traders.-A unique feature of the Chinese trade regime is that some …rms are allowed to import materials free of tari¤s but required to export their entire output-the so-called "processing trade regime." This policy was meant not only to protect a fragile domestic economy from foreign competition but also to open the economy when the Chinese government adopted its "reform and opening" policy in 1978. Given that processing traders are relatively immune from the liberalization caused by WTO accession, the estimation using the sample of processing traders should show insigni…cant liberalization e¤ect. Regression results are reported in Column 5 of Table 2 . As expected, we …nd the coe¢ cient of T arif f i2001 P ost02 t is highly insigni…cant and small in magnitude.
D. Other Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we present another series of robustness checks on other econometric concerns. Regression results are reported in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 here] Alternative Measures of Markup Dispersion.-In Columns 1-3, we experiment with three alternative measures of markup dispersion: Gini index, CV, and RMD. We …nd that T arif f i2001 P ost02 t has consistently negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ -cients, implying that our aforementioned results are not driven by any speci…c dispersion measure.
Finer Industry De…nition.-Thus far, our analysis has been based on the three-digit CIC industry level. To alleviate concerns about any aggregation bias, we conduct a robustness check at the four-digit CIC industry level (note that a trade-o¤ is that there are fewer observations within each industry-year cell and, therefore, potential measurement errors in the dispersion variable). Regression results are reported in Column 4. Clearly, our aforementioned results are robust to this …ner industry de…nition.
Check on Cross-Product, Within-Industry Tari¤ Variations.-As noted in Section 4.1, one drawback of our data is that tari¤ information is at the HS-6 product level, while our markup dispersion calculation is at the three-digit CIC industry level. Hence, mapping from the HS-6 product to the three-digit CIC industry level might conceal variations in tari¤ reduction across di¤erent HS-6 products but within the same three-digit industry, which could lead to underestimation of our trade liberalization e¤ect. As a check on this issue, we add an interaction between our regressor of interest (T arif f i2001 P ost02 t ) and the number of products within a three-digit industry. As shown in Column 5, the triple interaction term is not statistically signi…cant, implying that industries with more HS-6 products (and therefore potentially more variations in tari¤s within the industry) does not behave di¤erently from those with fewer products.
Checks on the Multi-Industry Issue.-One could be concerned that as …rms produce multiple products spanning di¤erent three-digit industries, our aforementioned DID estimation could miss the liberalization e¤ect from other related three-digit industries. To check this, we …rst investigate the e¤ect at the two-digit industry level, where the multi-product issue is less severe. As shown in Column 6, we still …nd a negative, albeit imprecisely estimated, e¤ect of trade liberalization on markup dispersion. Meanwhile, in Column 7, we focus on a subsample of …rms that produce in only one three-digit industry, and continue to …nd a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of trade liberalization.
A Sample of Non-Exporters.-Our data include many exporters, and hence their markups could also re ‡ect the conditions of foreign markets. To check whether our results are driven by changes in foreign markets, we focus on the sample of non-exporters. Regression results are reported in Column 8. Clearly, our …ndings remain robust to the sample of non-exporters, alleviating concerns about any complications due to foreign markets.
Two Periods Estimation.-One concern with the DID estimation is how to accurately calculate standard errors and, in turn, statistical inference. Thus far, we have followed the suggestion by Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2004) to cluster standard errors at the industry level. As a robustness check, we use another approach suggested by Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2004), which is to collapse the panel structure into two periods, one before and the other after WTO accession, then use the White-robust standard errors. Meanwhile, this exercise allows us to compare the long-run average e¤ect of trade liberalization on markup dispersion. Regression results are reported in Column 9, and show similar results.
Exclusion of Industries with Abnormal Estimated Output Elasticities.-As shown in Appendix Table 3 , three two-digit industries have negative estimated output elasticities of labor. To address the concern that our results might be driven by these industries, we exclude them and repeat our analysis. As shown in Column 10, our results are robust to the exclusion of these industries, suggesting that our …ndings are not driven by industries with abnormal estimated output elasticities.
E. Discussion
We have established that trade liberalization reduces the dispersion of …rm markups within a narrowly de…ned industry, which is an important step for the pro-competitive role of trade. In this subsection, we provide further evidence to support and understand this allocative e¢ ciency channel of trade liberalization. We …rst summarize the domestic market structures for Chinese two-digit industries before and after WTO accession as well as their changes during this period. Speci…cally, we use HHI to characterize overall competition degree and EG index to capture the spatial structure. Appendix Figure 3 reports the average HHI before the WTO accession and change in the HHI after the WTO accession, and Appendix Table 8 (2002)). WTO accession largely increased the geographic concentration of Chinese manufacturing industries: EG index values for all but one industry increased after WTO accession. As the geographic concentration is found to increase local competition and productivity (for a review, see Melo, Graham, and Noland, 2009), trade liberalization also intensi…es domestic market competition through the geographic location of production.
We further investigate whether imports increase in response to tari¤ reduction, which is direct evidence of the competition e¤ect of trade. With both import and tari¤ information available at the HS-6 product level, we investigate import response to trade liberalization at the product level. However, there are many HS-6 product categories with zero import values, which creates a potential estimation bias (i.e., the sample selection issue). To correct for this zero-trade-value issue, we use the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimation by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . Speci…cally, we regress the level of imports on our regressor of interest (i.e., T arif f p2001 P ost02 t , where T arif f p2001 is the tari¤ of product p in 2001), along with a set of product and year dummies, using the Poisson estimation. Regression results are reported in Column 1 of Table 4 . We …nd that imports increase in product categories experiencing more tari¤ reduction, corroborating our import-competition argument.
[Insert Table 4 here]
To further understand how trade liberalization changes markup dispersion, we look at the response of markup distribution at the di¤erent quantiles, speci…cally, p5, p25, p50, p75, p95 and the mean level. Regression results are summarized in Columns 2-7 of Table  4 . Trade liberalization increases markups at the lower quantiles but reduces markups at higher quantiles, thereby ‡attening markup distribution. We also …nd an insigni…cant e¤ect of trade liberalization on the mean markup level, which is di¤erent from Brandt et al. (2012)'s (i.e., they …nd a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of tari¤ reduction on mean markups). 16 If entry and exit mostly occurs at the lower end, these results suggest that …rm selection induced by trade liberalization improves markups at lower quantiles. If large …rms exist mostly at the higher end, these results also imply that competition from trade liberalization negatively a¤ects larger …rms, consistent with the …ndings by di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013). Note that the markup measure contains both price and cost information, and hence the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the dispersion of …rm markups can operate through price changes, cost changes, or both. To further understand the underlying mechanisms, we conduct two analyses, each having its own pros and cons due to data limitations. First, we use the ASIF data, which has a large coverage of …rms but no information on product prices. Instead, we calculate productivity for each …rm and each year based on the estimation of production functions, and use …rm productivity as a proxy for …rms' marginal costs. We then use the dispersion of …rm productivity to investigate the costchange channel of the liberalization e¤ect on the dispersion of …rm markups. Meanwhile, 16 There are two main di¤erences between these two studies-(1) markup estimation: we use quantitybased and translog production function with adjustment for …rm-speci…c input prices, while use revenue-based and Cobb-Douglas production function without adjustment for input prices; (2) regression speci…cation: we use T arif f i2001 P ost02 t as the regressor of interest along with a set of controls and estimate using the …xed e¤ect approach, whereas use T arif f it as the regressor of interest with year dummies and estimate in the …rst-di¤erence approach. To further understand which drives the di¤erent …ndings, we conduct two experiments. First, we use mean markups from 's production function estimation in our regression speci…cation, and also …nd a negative but insign…cant e¤ect (i.e., the coe¢ cient is 0:042 with a standard error of 0:076). Second, we use our estimated mean markups in 's regession speci…cation, and also …nd a negative but insigni…cant e¤ect (i.e., the coe¢ cient for one-year change is 0:057 with a standard error of 0:048). These results suggest that two di¤erences both play an important role in generating di¤erent …ndings between ours and Brandt et al. (2012)'s.
we control for productivity dispersion in the regression of markup dispersion on trade liberalization to partially isolate the price-change channel of the liberalization e¤ect. Regression results are reported in Columns 1-2 of Table 5 . Trade liberalization signi…cantly reduces the dispersion of …rm productivity, suggesting the response of costs to trade liberalization. Meanwhile, we continue to …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of trade liberalization on markup dispersion, after controlling for the dispersion of …rm productivity, suggesting that prices are also responsive to trade liberalization.
[Insert Table 5 here] Second, we use the sample of single-product …rms in the merged product-ASIF data, which contains information on output quantity and revenue, and therefore enables us to calculate product price. With estimated …rm markup, we are then able to back out marginal cost for each …rm and each year (similar to an approach used by De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik, 2014). However, a drawback of this analysis is that we are only able to do it for a particular group of …rms-that is, single-product …rms-for the period 2000-2005, and this raises external validity issues. Regression results using price dispersion and marginal cost dispersion as the outcome variables are reported in Columns 3-4 of Table 5 , respectively. We …nd that trade liberalization has both negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ects on these two outcomes. Combined, these two exercises suggest that both price and cost channels work for the liberalization e¤ect on the dispersion of …rm markups.
F. Heterogeneous E¤ects
Our aforementioned analyses estimate the average e¤ect of trade liberalization on the dispersion of …rm markups across Chinese manufacturing industries. In this subsection, we investigate the heterogeneous e¤ects of trade liberalization on the dispersion of …rm markups across …rms and regions, to further shed light on how markup dispersion is a¤ected by trade liberalization.
First, as shown in , surviving …rms and new entries/exiters respond di¤erently to changes in trade costs. In their model setup, changes in these two groups exactly cancel each other out, generating the unresponsiveness of the dispersion of …rm markups to trade costs. Following this argument, we divide …rms into two groups: surviving …rms (i.e., …rms present in our data both before and after WTO accession) and new entries/exiters (i.e., …rms that exited or entered our data after WTO accession). Note that our data are truncated; that is, for non-SOEs, only those with annual sales of …ve million RMB or more are surveyed. This could mean that after WTO accession, SOEs newly entered or exited markets, or non-SOEs shrank annual sales to less than or increased annual sales to more than …ve million RMB. Regression results using these two groups are reported in Columns 1-2 of Table 6 . There is a negative and signi…cant e¤ect of trade liberalization on dispersion of markups among new entries and exiters, but an insigni…cant e¤ect among surviving …rms. These results suggest that much of the liberalization e¤ect on markup dispersion stems from di¤erent markups among new entries and exiters.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Second, Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014) show that there is a diminishing e¤ect of trade liberalization on allocative e¢ ciency or markup dispersion. This pattern has been con…rmed by Edmon, Midrigan, and Xu (2014) and Hsu, Lu, and Wu (2014) in analyses using Taiwanese and Chinese data, respectively. Speci…cally, the diminishing e¤ect implies that when the market is already competitive-and therefore there is low dispersion of …rm markups before trade liberalization-the liberalization e¤ect on markup dispersion is smaller than in a case with a more monopolized pre-liberalization setting. The reasoning is that the markup has a lower bound at 1, and when there is less competitionand therefore more dispersion-there is more room for competition to decrease markup dispersion. Following this argument, we conduct two exercises. In the …rst, we divide …rms into SOEs and non-SOEs. 17 In China, SOEs enjoy various governmental protections, e.g., restrictions on market entry and privileged access to subsidized credit (for anecdotal evidence, see Li, Liu, and Wang (2012)), whereas non-SOEs face market discrimination and huge competitive pressure. As a result, SOEs largely encounter fewer challenges than non-SOEs (Du et al. (2014) ). Regression results using subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs are reported in Columns 3-4 of Table 6 , respectively. The e¤ect of trade liberalization on markup dispersion is larger for SOEs than non-SOEs. In our second exercise, we divide …rms based on location-speci…cally, coastal versus inland cities. When China opened its borders to overseas investors in 1978, access to domestic markets was restricted in the coastal regions, through the establishment of a series of special economic zones. In addition, due to better infrastructures and geographic features, markets in coastal regions have remained more open and more competitive than those in inland regions in the past decades. Regression results using subsamples of coastal and inland regions are reported in Columns 5-6 of Table 6 , respectively. The e¤ect in inland regions is bigger than that in coastal regions. Combined, these two analyses imply that distribution of …rm markups becomes relatively less dispersed in response to trade liberalization than when competition was …ercer before liberalization.
V. Conclusion
Resource misallocation has recently been the focus of attempts to understand why there are substantial di¤erences in productivity across countries. In this paper, we look at one important source of resource misallocation-product market distortions and speci…-cally markup dispersion-and investigate whether trade liberalization can reduce markup dispersion.
For empirical estimation, we …rst apply the methodology developed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to Chinese …rm-level data to recover …rm markups, then use China's WTO accession as an identi…cation strategy. Our results indicate that the distribution of …rm markups becomes ‡attened after trade liberalization. This …nding is robust to a battery of checks on the identifying assumption and other econometric concerns.
Our study also contributes to recent literature on gains from trade. While these studies focus on productive e¢ ciency gains from trade, we study another potential channelchange in markup dispersion-through which free trade can bene…t a nation. However, calculation of overall gains from trade (and through di¤erent channels, including the change in markup dispersion) requires a structural approach (e.g., Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2014), Hsu, Lu, and Wu (2014)), which is beyond the scope of this study.
A. Tari¤ Determinants
Our identi…cation uses tari¤ variations across industries in the pre-WTO period, and hence variations in tari¤ reductions after WTO accession. However, it must be recognized that China's tari¤ structure before its WTO accession was not randomly determined. Therefore, an understanding of how the pre-WTO tari¤s were determined is important to pinpoint potential biases in our DID estimation (i.e., the comparability between our treatment and control groups) and to attribute the change in markup dispersion to trade liberalization.
There are many reasons why the government imposes di¤erent tari¤s in di¤erent industries. According to the political economy literature (e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1994)), industries with more political power are more capable in lobbying and in ‡uenc-ing governments for more protection. In the case of China, SOEs are known to conduct businesses under the auspices of governments, and in some circumstances, are cash cows for local governments. Meanwhile, employment is always at the top list of the government's agenda, as it is related to social stability. For example, during the …nancial crisis in 2008-2009, President Hu Jintao announced publicly that SOEs could not lay o¤ their employees and should instead try to expand labor employment. Thus, to capture such political considerations, we use four variables: output share of SOEs, output share of other domestic …rms, total employment (in log), and employment growth rate in past years.
Another important set of tari¤ determinants is economic factors. For example, governments may protect infant industries to allow enough time for development. Meanwhile, as China is largely a labor-abundant and technologically underdeveloped country, it is expected that government may protect labor-intensive and/or technologically backward industries. To characterize these economic considerations, we use four variables: average wage per worker (in log), capital-labor ratio, value-added ratio, and industry age.
The choice of tari¤ structure could also re ‡ect the government's industrial policies; for example, import substitution versus export promotion. To capture such industrial policies, we use export intensity (measured as the ratio of total exports to total output). Finally, it is important to check whether the tari¤ structure is intended to preserve the distribution of …rm markups or reverse causality.
Regression results are reported in Appendix Table 2 Moreover, Columns 4-7 show that none of the four alternative measures of markup dispersion is statistically signi…cant and the t-statistics are very small. These results suggest that conditional on potential tari¤ determinants, China's industrial tari¤ structure is not reversely a¤ected by markup dispersion.
B. Production Function Estimation
In this appendix, we provide the details of how we estimate the production function (11) and compare our estimation with other methods used in the literature.
B.1. Quantity-Based Production Function Estimation with Adjustment for Input Prices
We rewrite production function (3) as
where x it is the vector of (log) physical inputs, speci…cally, l it , k it , m it ; is the vector of production function coe¢ cients to be estimated; ! it is …rm-speci…c productivity; and " it is an i.i.d. error term. A practical issue in estimating equation (13) is that both output (q it ) and three inputs (l it , k it , m it ) shall be in physical quantity terms. To this end, we use the merged product-ASIF data, which provide the physical quantity of output q it . Meanwhile, the ASIF data have information on employment, which allows us to measure labor input l it in physical quantity. However, capital k it and material m it inputs are only available in value terms; speci…cally, we use the net value of …xed assets as a measure of k it and the total value of intermediate materials as a measure of m it . To back out the physical quantity of k it and m it , we de ‡ate these values with the price indices provided by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012). In other words, the true estimation speci…cation of equation (13) is q it = f it (x it ; ) + B(w it ;x it ; ) + ! it + " it ;
wherex it is the vector of (log) de ‡ated inputs; and w it is the vector of …rm-speci…c input prices. Hence, consistent estimation of requires the proper control for unobserved …rm productivity ! it and the omitted …rm-speci…c input prices B(w it ;x it ; ). To proxy ! it , Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that
where Z it is a vector of controls including output price (p it ), 5-digit product dummies, city dummies, product market share (ms it ), exporter status (e it ), input tari¤, and output tari¤. Given the monotonicity of m t (:), we can have
To control for omitted …rm-speci…c input prices, we follow De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2014) by assuming that …rm-speci…c input prices w it are a function of output price, market share, and exporter status, i.e., w it = w t (p it ; ms it ; e it ) :
Then, the control function B(w it ;x it ; ) can be written as B(w it ;x it ; ) = B ((p it ; ms it ; e it ) x c it ; ; ) ; wherex c it = f1;x it g; and is an additional parameter vector to be estimated. In the …rst stage, we estimate the following equation
where it = f it (x it ; ) + B ((p it ; ms it ; e it ) x c it ; ; ) + ! it ; and obtain estimates of the expected output (^ it ) and the error term (" it ).
Meanwhile, to recover all the production function coe¢ cients in the second stage, we model that …rm productivity follows a …rst-order Markov movement, i.e.,
where it is an idiosyncratic shock.
From the …rst stage, the productivity ! it ( ; ) can be computed as ! it ( ; ) =^ it f it (x it ; ) B ((p it ; ms it ; e it ) x c it ; ; ) :
Then the idiosyncratic shock to productivity given , it ( ; ) can be obtained through a nonparametric regression of ! it ( ; ) on ! it 1 ( ; ). Finally, the moment conditions used to estimate the parameters are
In constructing the moment conditions, we follow the literature by assuming that capital is determined one period beforehand, and hence its current value is used in the moments. Under the translog output production function, the output elasticity of material is calculated as^ m it =^ m + 2^ mm m it +^ lm l it +^ km k it +^ lmk l it k it .
B.2. Alternative Production Function Estimations
In this subsection, we discuss three alternative approaches of production function estimation and compare them with our method.
Alternative I: Quantity-based and translog production function without adjustment for input prices. This approach still uses output in physical quantity terms, but does not control for omitted input prices in the estimation of production function. In other words, the estimation speci…cation of production function is q it = f it (x it ; ) + ! it + " it ;
and f it (x it ; ) = ll it + kk it + mm it + lll 2 it + kkk 2 it + mmm 2 it + lkl itkit + kmk itmit + lml itmit + lkml itkitmit :
Other procedures are similar to those used in production function estimation in this paper.
Alternative II: Revenue-based and translog production function without adjustment for input prices. This approach is similar to the approach used in Alternative I, except that revenue output (instead of quantity output) is used. Speci…cally, the estimation speci…cation of production function is q it = f it (x it ; ) + ! it + " it ;
whereq it is (log) de ‡ated output.
Alternative III: Revenue-based and Cobb-Douglas production function without adjustment for input prices. This approach is similar to the approach used in Alternative II, except that a Cobb-Douglas (instead of translog) production function is assumed. Speci…cally, the estimation speci…cation of production function is q it = g it (x it ; ) + ! it + " it ;
and g it (x it ; ) = ll it + kk it + mm it :
Estimated output elasticities of inputs for these production function estimations are reported in Appendix Table 4 , and correlations among markups from these estimations are provided in Appendix Table 6 . 
